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The benefits of elections 
The relations of a ruler with the public are somewhat similar 
to those of an employee with a disorganized employer – the 
public has no way to write a formal contract contingent on 
the ruler’s performance, and cannot decide whether to re-
place such an “employee” at any point in time. Thus, the 
ruler can abuse (absolute) power and (absolutely) disregard 
the interests of her employer, the public. 
Elections, the main formal attribute of a democratic society, 
partially solve the problem. In case of fair elections, voters 
may choose the candidate whom they expect to deliver the 
highest benefit to them. Thus, elections work as a selection 
device that allows to filter out the less attractive (incompe-
tent and non-benevolent) candidates. Incumbent politicians 
understand that their current performance will be treated by 
the public as a measure of their future performance. This 
creates incentives for the rulers to work for the sake of their 
society, even though there is no direct or immediate re-
ward/punishment mechanism in place. 
The costs of elections and political business cycles 
The costs of elections include not only direct costs, such 
as the cost of holding elections and spending on electoral 
campaigns. Elections also create the incentives for popu-
list policies on the eve of elections – incumbents may 
want to run fiscal expansion to improve the public’s ex-
pectations about their ability and benevolence. Such ex-
pansion usually takes the form of increased social trans-
fers, since their recipients are poor people who constitute 
a significant part of politically active population, and who 
are quite sensitive to transfers. The post-election period 
is often characterized by a fiscal contraction, borrowing 
or tax increases to finance or offset the effect of the pre-
election expansion. The term “political business cycle” 
(PBC) stands for such up and down dynamics around the 
time of elections. The cost of PBC can be approximated 
by the volume of resources that have to be generated 
(through increased borrowing or taxation) to cover devia-
tions from a steady policy. 
Political business cycles in Russia’s regions 
A recent study by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya which 
used data on gubernatorial elections has provided statis-
tical evidence for the existence of PBC in Russia’s re-
gions. It shows that the cycles are very short (the main 
changes take place one or two months around the elec-
tions), but quite significant – budgetary spending grows 
by 9% in the pre-election months and falls immediately 
after the elections. While such a cyclical nature is charac-
teristic of most budgetary items, the cycle is driven by 
social transfers, which grow by as much as 18% in the 
pre-election month.  
The end of a decade-long experiment with guber-
natorial elections 
Gubernatorial elections have been first instituted in Rus-
sia’s regions in 1991. Under President Yeltsin, regional 
governors enjoyed strong a bargaining position vis-à-vis 
the federal center and about one half of them belonged 
to the opposition. The situation has changed dramatically 
in Putin’s times. 
In 2004, the majority of governors turned to support the 
federal power in exchange for assurances that the latter 
will not meddle in regional politics. Governors that re-
mained in opposition either faced tough competition with 
federal candidates that had serious political and financial 
backing, or were simply not allowed to run for office. The 
most serious punishment to loyal governors suspected in 
corruption was promotion to ministerial positions in the 
federal government. 
In September of 2004, right after the terrorist raid on 
Beslan, President Putin moved to abolish gubernatorial 
elections and give himself the authority to appoint and 
dismiss governors. Formally, the President’s candidate 
has to be approved by a local Duma, but so far this has 
been a mere formality: to date, all presidential appoint-
ees (38) have been approved. In at least one case a local 
Duma approved an absolutely unknown candidate.  
The basic rationale provided by the Kremlin for this move 
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2) governors are captured by interest groups and do not 
serve public interests; 3) elections are captured by the 
local authorities and do not reflect public preferences 
while wasting a lot of resources on pre-election warfare. 
With such an explanation in mind, one could expect an 
increased turnover of corrupt or incompetent governors. 
However, about 4/5 among presidential appointees have 
been incumbents, as compared to a 2/3 election success 
rate of incumbent governors. The list of dismissed gover-
nors includes not only failed governors, whose reap-
pointment could have created massive protests in the 
regions, but also quite popular, but unsuitable governors. 
For example, Vasiliy Starodubtsev, a former GKChP 
member, who twice won in the first round of regional 
elections with 63% and 71% of votes in 1997 and in 
2001, was not appointed when his term expired. 
The notion of Political Business Cycle revisited: not 
all bad news 
One could argue that incumbent rulers run political busi-
ness cycles and win elections because of voters’ myopia. 
There are, however, alternative explanations for the 
presence of PBC, which are based on rational behavior of 
voters. For example, according to opportunistic theory of 
PBC, incumbents increase budget expenditures to dem-
onstrate (to signal about) their competence and benevo-
lence to the public. According to this theory, only the 
better incumbents do so. Yet another theoretic explana-
tion links cyclical changes in fiscal policy to policymakers’ 
experience. Suppose that a ruler’s performance depends 
not only on her talent and care for social welfare, but 
also on her experience of managing the region. In this 
case one could expect that performance (and fiscal pol-
icy) improves over time, being on average higher just 
before and lower just after the elections. Formal statisti-
cal tests, not accounting for the effect of experience, 
would provide support for the presence of PBC. However, 
one would not be able to conclude based on this evidence 
that PBC is driven by purely opportunistic motives.  
The experience factor has important behavioral implica-
tions for both voters and incumbent politicians. The rul-
ers’ exclusive ability to work in the “relevant” office and 
thus acquire the “relevant” skills implies that an incum-
bent can be rationally preferred by the public even to a 
more talented challenger. To the extent that voters ex-
hibit such an “incumbency bias”, experienced rulers can 
expect to be re-elected whether they capture the process 
of elections or not. 
It is worth noting that in reality skills are acquired not 
automatically by sitting in the office, but rather through 
hard work. Thus, a governor facing a talented challenger 
could still win the election by making a sufficiently high 
investment in own ability. In other words, the threat of 
electoral competition may lead to better performance in 
office, even without a proper contract that links tenure to 
performance. 
Empirical studies show that PBC in Russia’s regions have 
been driven by both experience and opportunistic fiscal 
expansion. The input of experience, however, is much 
smaller than that of opportunism: one term of experience 
increases budget spending by only 2%, and social ex-
penditures by 4%, which is almost ten times less than 
then the increase of these indicators in the pre-election 
quarter. Even though our data show that the positive 
effect of experience is not as strong it is good news that 
it exists. In contrast, it remains unclear what will drive 
governors’ incentives under the appointment system. 
Abolishing gubernatorial elections: benefits 
According to the new law, the President is now effectively 
deciding on who will be the governor in each region. This 
may be a fine arrangement to extent that the President is 
better informed about gubernatorial performance and is 
better educated than a representative voter in each re-
gion. Importantly, the President is a much less “disorgan-
ized employer” than the public at large and can recon-
sider employment of regional rulers at any time, thus 
reducing the scope for power abuse. Of course, these 
advantages are contingent on the President’s benevo-
lence and personal capacity to make the right choices.  
Finally, the abolishment of elections removes all costs 
associated with elections, both direct and indirect. 
… and costs 
The mechanism of direct presidential appointment of 
governors has also a number of costs attached. First, the 
President may face a conflict of interest in deciding whom 
to appoint: considerations of personal and political loyalty 
may contradict considerations of regional prosperity. 
Thus, more talented and popular governors who are 
more likely to have independent political views may be 
less likely to be appointed. 
Surely, the president of a federation cannot credibly 
commit to protecting the interests of a particular region 
(at the expense of other regions and the federation). This 
is likely to create wrong incentives for regional gover-
nors:  they will tend to serve the interests of the Presi-
dent – their effective employer – rather than those of the 
public. 
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